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The Optimal Provision of Information and Communication 
Technologies in Smart Cities 
Abstract 
We exploit the public good attributes of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) and theoretically analyze an aggregate economy of two smart cities in which ICTs are 
provided in either a decentralized or a centralized manner. We first determine the efficient ICT 
levels that maximize the aggregate surplus from the provision of ICTs in the two cities. Second, 
we compute the optimal level of ICT provision in the two cities in a decentralized regime in which 
spending on the ICTs is financed by a uniform tax on the city residents. Third, we ascertain the 
optimal level of ICT provision in the two cities in a centralized regime subject to equal provision 
of ICTs and cost sharing. Fourth, we show that if the two cities have the same preference for ICTs 
then centralization is preferable to decentralization as long as there is a spillover from the provision 
of ICTs. Finally, we show that if the two cities have dissimilar preferences for ICTs then 
centralization is preferable to decentralization as long as the spillover exceeds a certain threshold.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Review of the literature 
Regional scientists, urban economists, and researchers interested in studying technological 
change have increasingly begun to devote attention to the concept of a smart city. In this regard, 
the work of Caragliu et al. (2011), Peris-Ortiz et al. (2017), and Van den Buuse and Kolk (2019) 
tells us that a fundamental characteristic of smart cities is that they use information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) to improve urban functions in general and thereby provide a 
whole host of services designed to benefit the residents of such cities. For instance, Concilio et al. 
(2013) point out that ICTs can be used to promote sustainable lifestyles in and across emergent 
networks of what they call “smart peripheral cities” in Europe. Bakici et al. (2013) focus on a 
particular European city, namely Barcelona, and document the ways in which this city has become 
a significant smart city by first coming up with and then implementing a “smart city initiative.”  
Firmino and Duarte (2016) contend that even though ICTs can be useful in smart cities, 
there are circumstances in which these technologies enable surveillance and control in public areas 
and thereby undermine the usefulness of urban public spaces. Paulin (2016) discusses the extent 
to which the use of ICTs permits the government of a smart city to steer and control systems and 
what this ability means for what he calls “sustainable governance evolution.” After pointing to the 
many opportunities provided by ICTs to conduct smart urban policy, Kourtit et al. (2017) 
demonstrate how these technologies have actually been used to effectively manage smartphone 
data systems. This and other such applications reveal the usefulness of ICTs in addressing a variety 
of problems that fall into the category of “complex urban management” issues.  
Tekin (2017) concentrates on Turkey’s smart city projects and notes that such projects are 
successful only when adequate attention is paid to a project’s infrastructural dimension, its policy 
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areas and scope, and to key performance indicators. Melo et al. (2017) concentrate on Lisbon, 
Portugal and show that ICTs can be used to provide guidance information to drivers and that the 
provision of such information reduces travel times and improves the efficiency of road use in this 
city. Finally, Batabyal and Nijkamp (2019) utilize a dynamic model and chronicle some of the 
ways in which ICTs can enhance economic growth in smart cities. 
1.2. Objective 
The various studies discussed in section 1.1 have certainly advanced our understanding of 
the many ways in which ICTs can and do enhance the functioning of smart cities. This 
notwithstanding, our central claim in this paper is that the extant literature on smart cities has paid 
no theoretical attention to the question of how ICTs ought to be provided and to the effects of 
alternate ways of providing ICTs.  
Given this lacuna in the literature, we take advantage of the public good characteristics of 
ICTs and theoretically analyze an aggregate economy consisting of two smart cities4 in which ICTs 
can be provided in either a decentralized or a centralized manner. We first ascertain the efficient 
ICT levels that maximize the aggregate surplus from the provision of ICTs in the two cities. 
Second, we compute the level of ICT provision in the two cities in a decentralized regime in which 
spending on the ICTs is financed by a uniform tax on the city residents. Third, we determine the 
level of ICT provision in the two cities in a centralized regime subject to equal provision of ICTs 
and equal cost sharing. Fourth, we show that if the two cities have the same preference for ICTs 
then centralization is preferable to decentralization as long as there is a spillover from the provision 
of ICTs. Finally, we show that if the two cities have dissimilar preferences for ICTs then 
                                                            
4  
There are many real world instances of the kind of aggregate economy we have in mind. Examples include Minneapolis and Saint 
Paul, Dallas and Fort Worth, Raleigh and Durham, all in the United States, Gatineau and Ottawa in Canada, and Leeds and Bradford 
in the United Kingdom. 
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centralization is, once again, preferable to decentralization as long as the spillover exceeds a 
particular threshold.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 delineates our theoretical 
model of smart cities ܣ and ܤ that is adapted from the discussion in Oates (1972). Section 3 
computes the efficient ICT levels that maximize the total surplus from the provision of ICTs in 
cities ܣ and ܤ. Section 4 calculates the level of ICTs made available in cities ܣ and ܤ in a 
decentralized regime in which spending on the ICTs is financed by a uniform tax on the inhabitants 
of the two cities. Section 5 determines the level of ICT provision in cities ܣ and ܤ in a centralized 
regime subject to the condition that ICT provision and the sharing of costs are both the same in the 
two cities. Section 6 demonstrates that if cities ܣ and ܤ have identical preferences for ICTs then 
centralization is preferable to decentralization as long as there is a spillover from the provision of 
ICTs. Section 7 shows that if cities ܣ and ܤ have non-identical preferences for ICTs then 
centralization is, once again, preferable to decentralization but only if the spillover exceeds a 
certain threshold. Section 8 concludes and then suggests two ways in which the research described 
in this paper might be extended.  
2. The Theoretical Framework 
 Consider an aggregate economy that consists of two smart cities that are denoted by the 
subscript ݅ ൌ ܣ, ܤ. These two cities are assumed to have the same population size. In addition, the 
population in each city ݅ is represented by a continuum of individuals with a mass of unity. There 
are three goods that we work with in our model. The first is a private good that is denoted by ݔ. 
The second and the third goods are the ICTs in the two cities that are denoted by ݐ஺ and ݐ஻. The 
reader should note that several researchers have now pointed out that ICTs share the characteristics 
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of public goods.5 In this regard, consider the case of internet infrastructure. We know that the 
internet backbone, strictly speaking, is a rivalrous good either because of limited access or because 
of congestion stemming from limited bandwidth. However, with advances in technology, 
bandwidth has increased and this has made internet connectivity more of a non-rivalrous good. 
Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, we shall think of ICTs in the two smart cities ܣ and ܤ as 
being, in effect, like public goods.  
One unit of either ݐ஺ or ݐ஻ requires ܿ units of the private good to produce. The residents of 
the two smart cities are heterogeneous in the sense that they differ in their preference for ICTs. So, 
a resident of type ߙ who lives in smart city ݅ has a utility function given by 
ݑఈሺݔ, ݐ௜, ݐି௜ሻ ൌ ݔ ൅ ߙሼሺ1 െ ߚሻ logሺݐ௜ሻ ൅ ߚ logሺݐି௜ሻሽ,   (1) 
where ߚ ∈ ሾ0, ଵଶሿ	 measures the degree of the inter-city spillover from the provision of ICTs. To 
take an example from footnote 4, this means that the provision of ICTs in, for instance, 
Minneapolis results in a spillover in neighboring Saint Paul and vice versa. The two extreme cases 
are given by the endpoints of the closed interval ቂ0, ଵଶቃ. Specifically, when ߚ ൌ 0 there is no inter-
city spillover and the residents of smart city ݅ care only about the provision of ICTs in their own 
city. In contrast, when ߚ ൌ ଵଶ the residents in our aggregate economy care equally about the 
provision of ICTs in the two smart cities under study.  
 In each smart city ݅, residents with preference type ߙ are assumed to be distributed in 
accordance with a cumulative distribution function ܨ௜ሺߙሻ that is defined on the interval ሾ0, ߙതሿ and 
                                                            
5  
See Micevska (2006), Marks and Williamson (2007), Baron et al. (2014), and Coicaud (2016) for a more detailed corroboration of 
this claim. As pointed out by Hindriks and Myles (2013, p. 148), a public good possesses the properties of non-excludability and 
non-rivalry. Non-excludable means that if the public good is provided then no consumer can be excluded from consuming it. Non-
rivalry means that consumption of the public good by one individual does not diminish the quantity available for consumption 
available by any other individual. 
7 
 
has mean6 denoted by ߜ௜ ൏ ߙത/2. Now, consistent with the discussion in the previous paragraph of 
the heterogeneity of the residents in the two smart cities, we suppose that compared to smart city 
ܤ, smart city ܣ displays a stronger mean preference for ICTs. In symbols, this means that ߜ஺ ൐ ߜ஻. 
This concludes the description of our theoretical framework. We now compute the efficient ICT 
levels that maximize the total surplus from the provision of ICTs in smart cities ܣ and ܤ. 
3. Efficient ICT Levels  
 We begin by denoting the income of a type ߙ resident of smart city ݅ by ܯఈ೔. We can now 
express the total welfare of smart city ݅ as  
 
௜ܷ ൌ ׬ ݀ܨ௜ሺߙሻሾݔఈ೔ఈഥ଴ െ ܿݐ௜ ൅ ߙሼሺ1 െ ߚሻ logሺݐ௜ሻ ൅ ߚ logሺݐି௜ሻሽሿ.   (2) 
 
The aggregate welfare in the two smart cities under study can be written as ܹ ൌ ஺ܷ ൅ ܷ஻. We 
also have an aggregate budget constraint and this constraint tells us that we must have  
 
׬ ݀ܨ஺ሺߙሻݔఈಲఈഥ଴ ൅ ׬ ݀ܨ஻
ఈഥ
଴ ሺߙሻݔఈಳ ൌ ׬ ݀ܨ஺
ఈഥ
଴ ሺߙሻܯఈಲ ൅ ׬ ݀ܨ஻
ఈഥ
଴ ሺߙሻܯఈಳ െ ܿሺݐ஺ ൅ ݐ஻ሻ.  (3) 
 
In order to maximize the welfare of our aggregate economy, we need to set ߲ܹ ߲ݐ௜⁄ ൌ
0, ݅ ൌ ܣ, ܤ. 7 So, let us use equations (2), (3), and then differentiate ܹሺ∙ሻ with respect to ݐ஺. This 
gives us 
 
                                                            
6  
We suppose that the mean is equal to the median in both smart cities under study. An implication of this supposition is that the 
preference type distribution functions are symmetrical in nature.  
7  
We assume that the resulting solution is an interior solution. 
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డሼ௎ಲା௎ಳሽ
డ௧ಲ ൌ ׬ ݀ܨ஺
ఈഥ
଴ ሺߙሻ ቄఈ
ሺଵିఉሻ
௧ಲ െ ܿቅ ൅ ׬ ݀ܨ஻
ఈഥ
଴ ሺߙሻ ఈఉ௧ಲ ൌ 0   (4) 
 
and we get a similar equation when setting ߲ሼ ஺ܷ ൅ ܷ஻ሽ ߲ݐ஻⁄ ൌ 0. We can now use standard 
expressions from statistics for the expected value of a random variable---see Taylor and Karlin 
(1998, pp. 9-15)---to simplify the two first order necessary conditions for an optimum. This gives 
us 
 
ఋ೔ሺଵିఉሻ
௧೔ ൅
ఋష೔ఉ
௧ష೔ ൌ ܿ, ݅ ൌ ܣ, ܤ.      (5) 
 
Solving the system of two equations described by (5) in the two unknowns ݐ஺ and ݐ஻, we get the 
efficient ICT levels that maximize the total surplus in our aggregate economy consisting of smart 
cities ܣ and ܤ. Let us denote these efficient levels by ݐ௜ா, ݅ ൌ ܣ, ܤ. We obtain 
 
ݐ௜ா ൌ ఋ೔ሺଵିఉሻାఋష೔ఉ௖ , ݅ ൌ ܣ, ܤ.      (6) 
 
Inspecting equation (6), we see that the efficient ICT levels depend positively on the mean 
preference for ICTs ሺߜ௜, ߜି௜ሻ in the two smart cities and negatively on the number of units of the 
private good ሺܿሻ needed to produce and provide the two efficient ICT levels. Our next task is to 
determine the ICT levels in smart cities ܣ and ܤ in a decentralized setting in which spending on 
the ICTs is financed by a uniform tax on the inhabitants of the two cities. 
 
 
9 
 
4. Decentralized Provision of ICTs 
 In the decentralized regime, each smart city independently chooses8 ICT level ݐ௜ to 
maximize total city welfare ܷ ௜. Public spending on ICTs in each smart city is financed by a uniform 
tax on the residents of the city. This means that if the ݅ݐ݄ smart city provides ICTs at level ݐ௜ then 
each inhabitant of smart city ݅ pays a tax given by ߬௜ ൌ ܿݐ௜. Given these changes, the expression 
for ௜ܷ is now given by 
 
௜ܷ ൌ ׬ ݀ܨ௜ఈഥ଴ ሺߙሻൣܯఈ೔ െ ܿݐ௜ ൅ ߙሼሺ1 െ ߚሻ logሺݐ௜ሻ ൅ ߚ logሺݐି௜ሻሽ൧.   (7) 
 
The first order necessary conditions for an interior optimum are given by setting ߲ ௜ܷ ߲ݐ௜⁄ ൌ 0, ݅ ൌ
ܣ, ܤ. Doing this and then simplifying the resulting expressions gives us the two optimal ICT levels 
under decentralization. Denoting these two levels by ݐ௜஽, ݅ ൌ ܣ, ܤ, we get 
 
ݐ௜஽ ൌ ఋ೔ሺଵିఉሻ௖ , ݅ ൌ ܣ, ܤ.      (8) 
 
 Inspecting equation (8), we see that like the efficient ICT levels case analyzed in section 3 
and described by equation (6), the optimal decentralized ICT levels also depend positively on the 
mean preference for ICTs ሺߜ௜ሻ in the two smart cities and negatively on the number of units of the 
private good ሺܿሻ needed to produce and provide the two decentralized ICT levels. That said, 
subtracting the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (8) from the RHS of equation (6), we see that  
 
                                                            
8  
If these choices are not independent but sequential then our findings in this section may well change.  
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ݐ௜ா െ ݐ௜஽ ൌ ఋష೔ఉ௖ ൐ 0       (9) 
 
as long as ߚ ൐ 0.  
Equation (9) tells us that as long as there is an ICT provision related spillover between 
smart cities ܣ and ܤ, the efficient ICT levels that are provided are greater in magnitude than the 
ICT levels provided in the decentralized regime. Further, in the special case in which there is no 
spillover and hence ߚ ൌ 0, the efficient and the decentralized ICT levels coincide. We now 
ascertain the level of ICT provision in a centralized regime subject to the condition that ICT 
provision and the sharing of costs are the same in smart cities ܣ and ܤ.  
5. Centralized Provision of ICTs 
 In the centralized regime, the pertinent ICT levels in the two smart cities are chosen by a 
central authority with two specific conditions. First, there is the equal provision requirement and 
this means that ݐ஺ ൌ ݐ஻. Second, there is equal cost sharing of the ICTs that are provided and this 
means that each inhabitant in either smart city pays ߬௜ ൌ ܿሺݐ஺ ൅ ݐ஻ሻ 2.⁄  These two conditions 
together ensure that the central authority displays no favoritism towards either smart city ܣ or ܤ. 
With these two changes, the expression for ௜ܷ now is  
 
௜ܷ ൌ ׬ ݀ܨ௜ఈഥ଴ ሺߙሻൣܯఈ೔ െ ܿݐ ൅ ߙ logሺݐሻ൧.    (10) 
 
To determine the optimal ICT level or ݐ, we need to solve for ݀ ሼ ஺ܷ ൅ ܷ஻ሽ ݀ݐ⁄ ൌ 0. Using equation 
(10) and then differentiating with respect to ݐ, we get 
 
ௗሼ௎ಲା௎ಳሽ
ௗ௧ ൌ ׬ ݀ܨ஺
ఈഥ
଴ ሺߙሻ ቄఈ௧ െ ܿቅ ൅ ׬ ݀ܨ஻ሺߙሻ ቄ
ఈ
௧ െ ܿቅ
ఈഥ
଴ ൌ 0.   (11) 
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Using standard expressions from statistics for the expected value of a random variable---see Taylor 
and Karlin (1998, pp. 9-15)---we can simplify the RHS of equation (11). This gives us 
 
ఋಲାఋಳ
௧ െ 2ܿ ൌ 0.      (12) 
 
Denoting the optimal ICT level in the centralized setting by ݐ஼, we get  
 
ݐ஼ ൌ ఋಲାఋಳଶ௖ .       (13) 
 
 Inspecting equation (13), we see that like the cases analyzed in sections 3 and 4, the optimal 
centralized ICT level depends positively on the mean preference for ICTs in the two smart cities 
ሺߜ஺, ߜ஻ሻ and negatively on the number of units of the private good ሺܿሻ needed to produce and 
provide the centralized ICT level. Subtracting the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (13) from the 
RHS of equation (6), we see that  
 
ݐ௜ா െ ݐ஼ ൌ ሺఋ೔ିఋష೔ሻሺଵିଶఉሻଶ௖ .      (14) 
 
Now recall that the spillover parameter ߚ ∈ ሾ0, ଵଶሿ and that ߜ஺ ൐ ߜ஻. Using these two pieces of 
information along with the result contained in equation (14), we deduce that 
ݐ஺ா ൒ ݐ஼ ൒ ݐ஻ா.      (15) 
 The result in (15) contains an interesting but negative finding about the centralized 
provision of ICTs in the two smart cities under study. Specifically, we see that in the centralized 
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regime, ICTs will be underprovided in the smart city that has a stronger mean preference for these 
technologies ሺݐ஺ா ൒ ݐ஼ሻ and overprovided in the smart city that has a weaker mean preference for 
these same technologies ሺݐ஼ ൒ ݐ஻ாሻ. We now want to show that if the smart cities ܣ and ܤ have 
identical preferences for ICTs then centralization is preferable to decentralization as long as there 
is a spillover from the provision of ICTs. 
6. Identical Preferences for ICTs 
 We model the identical preferences for ICTs in the two smart cities by supposing that ߜ஺ ൌ
ߜ஻. Also, since the spillover from the provision of ICTs is positive, we have ߚ ൐ 0. The welfare 
of the ݅ݐ݄ smart city in the decentralized regime is given by equation (7) and therefore equation 
(8) gives us the optimal ICT levels in this regime. So, using this last result and denoting the total 
income in the ݅ݐ݄ smart city by ܯ௜, we can now write 
 
௜ܷ஽ ൌ ܯ௜ െ ߜ௜ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ൅ ߜ௜ ቂሺ1 െ ߚሻ݈݋݃ ቄఋ೔ሺଵିఉሻ௖ ቅ ൅ ߚ݈݋݃ ቄ
ఋష೔ሺଵିఉሻ
௖ ቅቃ.  (16) 
 
Given equation (16), the welfare in our aggregate economy of smart cities ܣ and ܤ can be written 
as 
 
ܹ஽ ൌ ܯ െ ሺߜ஺ ൅ ߜ஻ሻሺ1 െ ߚሻ ൅ ሺߜ஺ ൅ ߜ஻ሻ݈݋݃ ቄଵିఉ௖ ቅ ൅ ሼߜ஺ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ൅ ߜ஻ߚሽ logሺߜ஺ሻ ൅ ሼߜ஺ߚ ൅
ߜ஻ሺ1 െ ߚሻሽ logሺߜ஻ሻ,           (17) 
 
where we have used ܯ ൌ ܯ஺ ൅ܯ஻ to denote the total income in our aggregate economy.  
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 When ICTs are provided to the two smart cities in the centralized regime, the welfare of 
the ݅ݐ݄ smart city is given by equation (10) and the optimal ICT level or ݐ஼ is given by equation 
(13). Using these two pieces of information, we can write the welfare of the ݅ݐ݄ smart city as 
 
௜ܷ஼ ൌ ܯ௜ െ ఋ೔ାఋష೔ଶ ൅ ߜ௜݈݋݃ ቄ
ఋ೔ାఋష೔
ଶ௖ ቅ,     (18) 
 
and the welfare of our aggregate economy as 
 
ܹ஼ ൌ ܯ െ ሺߜ஺ ൅ ߜ஻ሻ ൅ ሺߜ஺ ൅ ߜ஻ሻ݈݋݃ ቄఋಲାఋಳଶ௖ ቅ.    (19) 
 
Because ߜ஺ ൌ ߜ஻ ൌ ߜ, the two aggregate welfare expressions in equations (17) and (19) simplify 
to 
 
ܹ஽ ൌ ܯ െ 2ߜሺ1 െ ߚሻ ൅ 2ߜ݈݋݃ ቄଵିఉ௖ ቅ ൅ 2ߜlogሼߜሽ    (20) 
 
and 
 
ܹ஼ ൌ ܯ െ 2ߜ ൅ 2ߜ݈݋݃ ቄఋ௖ቅ.      (21) 
 
Subtracting the RHS of equation (20) from the RHS of equation (21), we are able to 
confirm that 
ܹ஼ െܹ஽ ൌ െ2ߜሼߚ ൅ logሺ1 െ ߚሻሽ ൐ 0,    (22) 
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as long as ߚ ∈ ቂ0, ଵଶቃ.	 We have just demonstrated that when there is an inter-city spillover from the 
provision of ICTs, relative to decentralization, the centralized provision of such technologies gives 
rise to a higher level of welfare. In contrast, when there is no spillover and hence ߚ ൌ 0, the welfare 
levels under centralization and decentralization are identical. We now proceed to our final task in 
this paper and that is to demonstrate that if smart cities ܣ and ܤ have non-identical preferences for 
ICTs then, once again, centralization is preferable to decentralization as long as the technological 
spillover ߚ exceeds a certain threshold.  
7. Dissimilar Preferences for ICTs 
 We account for the dissimilar preferences for ICTs in the two smart cities by supposing 
that the inequality ߜ஺ ൐ ߜ஻ holds. Next, we write the expression corresponding to equation (22) in 
the case where the two smart cities have dissimilar preferences for ICTs. After some algebraic 
steps, we get  
 
ܹ஼ െܹ஽ ൌ െߚሺߜ஺ ൅ ߜ஻ሻ െ ሺߜ஺ ൅ ߜ஻ሻ logሺ1 െ ߚሻ ൅ ሺߜ஺ ൅ ߜ஻ሻ݈݋݃ ቄఋಲାఋಳଶ ቅ െ ሾሼߜ஺ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ൅
ߜ஻ߚሽ logሺߜ஺ሻ ൅ ሼߜ஺ߚ ൅ ߜ஻ሺ1 െ ߚሻሽ logሺߜ஻ሻሿ.       (23) 
 
Focusing for the moment on the parameter ߚ denoting the technological spillover, we can rewrite 
the expression on the RHS of equation (23) as  
ܹ஼ െܹ஽ ൌ ∆ܹሺߚሻ,      (24) 
where ∆ denotes the change in welfare.  
 Evaluating ∆ܹሺߚሻ at ߚ ൌ 0, we get  
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∆ܹሺ0ሻ ൌ ሺߜ஺ ൅ ߜ஻ሻ݈݋݃ ቄఋಲାఋಳଶ ቅ െ ߜ஺ logሺߜ஺ሻ െ ߜ஻ logሺߜ஻ሻ.   (25) 
 
After some algebraic steps, the RHS of equation (25) can be simplified and signed. In particular, 
because ߜ஺ ൐ ߜ஻, this process gives us  
 
∆ܹሺ0ሻ ൌ ߜ஺ ቂ݈݋݃ ቄଵଶ ቀ
ఋಳ
ఋಲ ൅ 1ቁቅ ൅
ఋಳ
ఋಲ ݈݋݃ ቄ
ଵ
ଶ ቀ
ఋಲ
ఋಳ ൅ 1ቁቅቃ ൏ 0.   (26) 
 
Next, we want to evaluate ∆ܹሺߚሻ at ߚ ൌ ଵଶ. This gives us 
 
∆ܹ ቀଵଶቁ ൌ ሺߜ஺ ൅ ߜ஻ሻ݈݋݃ ቄ
ఋಲାఋಳ
ଶ ቅ െ
ሺఋಲାఋಳሻ
ଶ െ ሺߜ஺ ൅ ߜ஻ሻ݈݋݃ ቀ
ଵ
ଶቁ െ
ሺఋಲାఋಳሻ
ଶ ሼlogሺߜ஺ሻ ൅
logሺߜ஻ሻሽ.            (27) 
 
After a couple of steps of algebra, the RHS of equation (27) can also be simplified and signed. 
This time we get 
 
∆ܹ ቀଵଶቁ ൌ ሺߜ஺ ൅ ߜ஻ሻ ൤݈݋݃ ൜
ఋಲାఋಳ
ඥఋಲఋಳൠ െ
ଵ
ଶ൨ ൐ 0.    (28) 
 
 Let us now differentiate the expression for ∆ܹሺߚሻ in equation (23) with respect to the 
spillover parameter ߚ. This gives us  
 
ௗሼ∆ௐሺఉሻሽ
ௗఉ ൌ ሺߜ஺ ൅ ߜ஻ሻ
ఉ
ଵିఉ ൅ ሺߜ஺ െ ߜ஻ሻ݈݋݃ ቀ
ఋಲ
ఋಳቁ ൐ 0,   (29) 
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as long as ߜ஺ ൐ ߜ஻. Our analysis thus far in this section leads to three results. First, we showed that 
∆ܹሺ0ሻ ൏ 0. Second, we pointed out that ∆ܹ ቀଵଶቁ ൐ 0. Finally, since differentiability implies 
continuity,9 we have shown that ݀ሼ∆ܹሺߚሻሽ ݀ߚ⁄  is both continuous and monotonically increasing 
in ߚ. These three results and the mean value theorem10 together tell us that there exists a threshold 
ߚ∗ ∈ ቀ0, ଵଶቁ such that ∆ܹሺߚ∗ሻ ൌ 0 and ∆ܹሺߚሻ ൐ 0 for ߚ ∈ ቀߚ∗,
ଵ
ଶቃ.  
 Our analysis of the provision of ICTs in smart cities ܣ and ܤ shows that there is a clear 
tradeoff between the centralization and the decentralization regimes. Specifically, under 
centralization, an excessively high level of ICTs are provided in the smart city with a lower 
preference for these technologies and an insufficiently low level of ICTs are provided in the smart 
city with a higher preference for these same technologies. In addition, when there is an inter-city 
spillover from the provision of ICTs, relative to decentralization, centralization leads to higher 
welfare in the aggregate economy of two smart cities. Finally, if the inter-city spillover from ICT 
provision is sufficiently strong, then the additional utility obtained by the residents of the smart 
city with a stronger preference for the ICTs provided in the smart city with a weaker preference 
for such provision compensates them for the loss of utility stemming from the underprovision of 
ICTs in their own smart city. As a result, total welfare in this last instance with centralized ICT 
provision is higher than what it would be with decentralized provision. This completes our analysis 
of the optimal provision of ICTs in an aggregate economy consisting of two smart cities. 
 
 
                                                            
9  
See Theorem 5.2 in Rudin (1976, p. 104) for additional details. 
10  
See Rudin (1976, pp. 107-108) for a textbook exposition of the mean value theorem. 
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8. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we exploited the public good features of ICTs and theoretically analyzed an 
aggregate economy of two smart cities in which ICTs could be provided in either a decentralized 
or a centralized manner. We first determined the efficient ICT levels that maximized the aggregate 
welfare from the provision of ICTs in the two smart cities. Second, we computed the optimal levels 
of ICT provision in the two cities in a decentralized regime in which spending on the ICTs was 
financed by a uniform tax on the city residents. Third, we ascertained the optimal level of ICT 
provision in the two cities in a centralized regime subject to equal ICT provision and cost sharing. 
Fourth, we showed that if the two cities have the same preference for ICTs then centralization was 
preferable to decentralization as long as there was a spillover from the provision of ICTs. Finally, 
we showed that if the two cities have dissimilar preferences for ICTs then centralization was, once 
again, preferable to decentralization as long as the spillover exceeded a critical threshold.  
 The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. In what 
follows, we suggest three potential extensions. First, we can ask how ICT using smart cities 
function during an economic crisis. We have not studied this question and therefore it would be 
useful to determine how ICTs might be used to improve the quality of life of the residents of a 
smart city so that they are able to participate meaningfully in this city’s cultural and political life 
during a crisis. Second, it would be helpful to determine the extent to which the methodology 
employed by, for instance, Oladi (2004) can be used to study investments in ICTs by smart cities 
in alternate strategic environments. Finally, one could examine how ICTs might be used to bring 
about enhancements in the governance of and the institutions in smart cities so that such cities 
endeavor to meet the twin objectives of environmental and financial sustainability. Studies that 
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analyze these aspects of the underlying problem in smart cities will provide additional insights into 
the nexuses between the use of ICTs on the one hand and economic welfare on the other.  
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